
















Abstract - Recently a number of studies on banking systems’ procyclicality have been drawn. Such 
an issue, often developed as a consequence of Basel 2 agreements, is related with credit crunch 
phenomena and financial stability. Typically, a temporary shock may produce a long term effect 
following or amplifying fluctuations through finance. For this reason procyclicality may 
significantly affect capital accumulation and long-term growth. Therefore, verifying and measuring 
whether a banking system is, or is not, procyclical is relevant in order to understand which effects 
regulatory schemes and financial architectures can produce on capital formation processes. While 
studies generally have a short period perspective, this paper analyses business fluctuations and 
banking cycles in the long run. The Italian financial history could provide useful insights because its 
evolutionary path experimented two different banking patterns. Universal banking prevailed until 
the Great Depression, whilst specialised financial institutions emerged afterwards. Economic 
historians have considered Italian universal banks, up to the early 1930s, a convincing example of 
procyclical intermediaries. Such hypothesis relies on qualitative research based on case studies, but 
it has not been verified in quantitative terms, yet. Thus, this paper aims to verify procyclicality of 
the Italian banking system in the long run applying VAR analysis on a wide set of economic and 
financial indicators. What emerges is that a certain cycle-smoothing effect is observed during the 
whole period, in spite of the major institutional shock occurred in the early 1930s (i.e. the new bank 
law), whilst relevant changes in banks’ asset structures suggest that central bank and government 
intervention had important impact on banks behaviour and policies. 
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 1  1   
Are Banks Procyclical? 
Evidence from the Italian Case (1890-1973)
* 




During the last decade, a number of studies on the procyclicality of financial 
and banking systems were published in order to explain the nature, the reason, and 
the extent of credit fluctuations
1. According to wide empirical evidence, we 
observe at least two major stylised facts about the relationship between finance 
and business cycles, even with regard to the most recent credit cycles and 
financial crises. The first one is that lending sharply increases in quantity when 
business cycles experience expansionary phases, whilst an often dramatic 
downturn in it occurs whenever the cycle slows down. In both circumstances, 
bank loans are generally growing and falling more than proportionally to 
fluctuations of real variables. Historically, there is strong evidence of the kind of 
amplifications which depend on financial «euphoria» or «credit crunch» 
(Kindleberger, 1978). The second stylised fact is that loans’ performance follows 
a peculiar pattern over business cycles: during upward phases, losses and charge-
offs are substantially low, while they start to increase significantly at the end of 
the expansionary cycle, hugely augmenting during crises (Berger and Udell, 
2002). As Alan Greenspan observed, «the worst loans are made at the top of the 
business cycle»
2. Credit cycles, therefore, would tend to amplify economic cycles, 
 
*   Previous drafts of this paper were presented at the Economic History Society Annual 
Conference, held in Exeter, United Kingdom, on 28 March-1 April 2007; at the Economic and 
Business Historical Society Annual Conference, held in Providence (RI), USA, on April 26-28 
2007; and at the European Historical Economics Society Annual Conference, held in Lund, 
Sweden, on June 29-July 1, 2007. We would like to thank all participants to these conferences and 
in particular Stefano Battilossi, David Chambers, Jari Eloranta, Roberto Ricciuti, Catherine 
Schenk, Isabel Schnabel, Raffaello Seri and Martin Uebele for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. Usual disclaims apply. 
1   Many recent studies deal with procyclical behaviours of banking activities according to 
different perspectives. Among them we could mention: Rajan, 1994; Bikker and Hu, 2002; 
Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano, 2004. 
2   Quoted by Berger and Udell, 2002, p. 1. 2  2   
both because banks adopt risky behaviours and because they tend to relax 
effective screening on borrowers’ credit-worthiness. Given such a scenario and 
taking into account the information theory of financial intermediaries, we have to 
reckon that strong and ample credit fluctuations may have a negative effect on the 
effectiveness of the financial structure in screening borrowers (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990). 
Thus, such an issue, often developed as a consequence of Basel 2 agreements 
on risk ratios, is strongly related both with credit crunch phenomena and financial 
intermediaries stability in its relations with business cycles (Bliss and Kaufman, 
2003). Besides, many studies have emphasised the relationship between business 
cycles and financial stability in order to offer models and analyses for central 
bankers and financial regulators. This kind of approach came to be known as 
«macro-prudential analysis» and can provide useful models and tools for those 
who are responsible of financial stability (Kaminsky 1999; Logan, 2000). Given 
such purposes, analysis is generally carried on medium term periods, while there 
is an astonishing lack of studies about long run relationships between business 
cycle fluctuations and the banking sector. That is, currently there are no reliable 
assessments about macroeconomic relations between business cycles and financial 
systems while structural changes occur. In particular, even though a long term 
approach has recently been adopted with a specific attention to technological 
innovations – following an explicit neo-Schumpeterian approach (Perez, 2002) – 
it is not presently possible to evaluate how important these relations might be, if 
any, when structural changes, such as institutional breaks or technological 
innovations, take place. 
Economic literature generally considers banking systems as naturally 
procyclical, without distinguishing among different patterns of bank specialization 
(Allen and Gale, 2000). Banking systems would suffer, and to some degree 
amplify, cyclical variations in credit demand and in borrowers behaviours (Berger 
and Udell, 2002; Jimenez and Saurina, 2005), while an explicit counter-cyclical 
hypothesis is less considered by scholars (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1998; 
Eber, 1998). Thus, procyclicality would affect the continuity of capital formation 3  3   
processes, hence having a significant impact on the determination of economic 
growth rates and timing (Demirguç-Kunt and Levine, 2001). 
Historical-economic literature tends to largely confirm such hypotheses 
referring to specific events and business cases (single financial institutions, 
banking crises, etc.). Findings at a micro level suggest that banking systems are 
characterised by various degrees of procyclicality depending on functional 
specialisation patterns chosen by financial intermediaries or central monetary 
authorities. In this sense, despecialised banking systems would be subject to 
cyclical fluctuations and to the worsening of firms’ financial position more often 
than specialised ones, therefore requiring monetary authorities to promptly adopt 
expansionary monetary policies to preserve macroeconomic stability. The German 
case demonstrates a procyclical behaviour of universal banks, either up to 1914 
(Fohlin, 1998 and 2000) and in the interwar period. In the Italian case such a 
macroeconomic constraint would explain great banks bail-outs in the early 1930s 
and the banking system reform culminated in the Bank Act of 1936 (Toniolo, 
1978 and 1993; de Cecco, 1997). 
According to historiography, Italian universal banks showed a strong 
procyclical behaviour in the 1890s-1930s period (Confalonieri, 1974-76, 1982 and 
1994). The early 1930s crisis is taken as a major example of that: when economy 
slowed down while monetary restriction policies were being adopted, universal 
banks reduced their loans to firms (in which they often held shareholding quotas 
or even had gained a substantial control), thus causing negative effects on capital 
accumulation (Ferri, 1994). The mid-1930s banking system reform would have 
reduced procyclicality, thanks to the introduction of specialisation in credit supply 
(Cotula, 1999). 
The paper aims to verify procyclicality of the Italian banking system in the 
long run, from 1890 to 1973, adopting a quantitative approach. Such a long term 
quantitative analysis – about 80 years – is the first attempt to verify the hypothesis 
of banking system procyclicality for a European late comer country. The focus of 
this paper is on testing some hypotheses about cyclical behaviour of the banking 
system in relation to real macro-economic variables, such as gross domestic 4  4   
product and aggregate investments, while in a next work we will concentrate in 
particular on monetary and financial variables
3. Moreover, this approach will 
permit to check whether universal banks are more sensitive to business cycles 
fluctuations than other intermediaries, both in the sense that they strongly amplify 
business cycle effects (if monetary authorities fail to provide stabilization 
policies) and that they react more than other intermediaries to stagnation and 
recession phases, as maintained by Renato De Mattia, who emphasizes the 
counter-cyclical behaviour of savings institutions as compared to more procyclical 
universal banks (De Mattia, 1990). Eventually, we try to understand whether the 
banking system had been more procyclical before 1936 than afterwards, and if 
banks behaviour anticipated or followed variations in the most relevant 
macroeconomic indicators considered. That may shed light on whether, and to 
which extent, the new 1936 Banking Act contributed to a consistent reduction of 
bank procyclicality’s effects on Italian economic growth capabilities
4. 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 briefly deals with sources and 
methodologies; section 3 presents and discusses empirical evidences on the Italian 
credit cycles in the long run and suggests possible explanations; in section 4 
macro variables and banks’ ratio are estimated using vector autoregression, to 
check their correlations and suggestions emerging by evidence analysed in the 
previous section; finally, section 5 offers provisional concluding remarks. 
 
2. Methodologies and sources 
The analysis considers both the banking system as a whole and in its main 
components (banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks). We collected balance 
sheets figures from two different databases realised by the Bank of Italy, 
 
3   On the nature of Italian business cycles see Delli Gatti, Gallegati and Gallegati, 2003. 
Besides, we are currently collecting financial and macroeconomic data about other economies, 
both industrialised and backward ones, in order to verify our hypotheses with a broader and more 
representative sample of countries. 
4   Even though our use of banking system’s indicators and macroeconomic variables may 
seem similar to that adopted by Neuburger and Stokes (1974), our purpose here is not to evaluate 
whether and in which measure Italian universal banks fostered industrialisation, but to verify 
possible cyclical regularities of those variables. For some critical remarks on Neuberger and 
Stokes, 1974 see Tilly, 1992. 5  5   
reclassified to get homogeneous data (Cotula et alii, 1996; Banca d’Italia, 1937-
1975). As for macroeconomic variables (gross domestic product, gross domestic 
product per capita, and investments as a whole and by main sectors) we used 
historical estimates and series provided by Rossi, Sorgato, Toniolo (1993). The 
long run perspective, however, could produce reliability issues as far as the choice 
of deflators is concerned. Therefore, whenever possible, we opted for a ratios 
analysis not to incur – partially, at least – in distortion effects connected with 
price’s dynamics on the long period (when necessary, however, we deflated our 
series with a 1961 deflator). As it is well known, a serious problem concerning 
sources is the quality and extent of information they are able to offer. As a matter 
of fact, our balance sheets’ time series data are lacking relevant information, such 
as interest rates for different borrowers and loans losses or charge-offs. 
Usually, the procyclical behaviour of banking systems is measured through 
an indicator of business performance, as given by profit rates (e.g. Bikker and Hu, 
2002 provide a cross-section analysis on 26 countries in the last 20 years). Richer 
and more recent data panels permit sophisticated analyses, both on banking 
activities and firms’ performance. Unfortunately available data do not allow to 
employ methodologies such as, for instance, the «institutional memory 
hypothesis» (Berger and Udell, 2002) and neither to follow relatively simple and 
commonly used approaches based on loan loss provisions and bad debts data (e.g. 
Quagliariello, 2006). Indeed, the lacking of information on interest rates applied 
to different borrowers (by size, sector, technology, ownership, etc.) and on non-
performing loans compelled us to employ rougher indicators: i) profitability (or, 
as we will see, capital net worth), as a proxy of bank screening capability; ii) total 
assets, as a proxy of credit supply; iii) assets’ composition ratios, to better control 
for credit crunch. 
As well known, usual indicators of firms’ profitability are ROE (return on 
equity) and ROA (return on assets). Even if, given the available data in sources, 
we had to take a modified, not-standard ROE (here ROE is defined as return on 
equity plus retained earnings), these ratios do not seem sufficiently reliable 
indicators of real profitability of the banking system, at least in the Italian case. In 6  6   
Appendix A we provide four graphs plotting ROE time series for the system as a 
whole as well as for its single components (banks, cooperative banks, and savings 
banks). 
An apparent asymptotic trend with a strikingly strong upward in the last years 
suggests that this kind of ratios is not that useful to measure true profitability of 
banks. We can observe quite similar dynamics for the other main profitability 
ratio (ROA). This is very consistent with most current assumptions on credit 
cycles as presented above: banks’ balance sheets tend to consistently undervalue 
their profits (thus, their dividends) whenever the business cycle is boosting real 
and financial activities and to understate their loans losses in downturns, unless 
compelled by very difficult situations, such as the threat of failure. Besides, usual 
indicators of profitability, such as ROE and ROA, tend to be quite dependent on 
bank’s management and executives’ choices, sometimes maintained even in sharp 
contrast with shareholders. That is why we decided to use a sort of capital 
adequacy ratio as a proxy of real medium term profitability of banks; we defined 
it as the ratio of the sum of equity, retained earnings and all kinds of reserves to 
total assets (basically Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital). Such a ratio can be 
assumed as a good proxy of banks’ medium-long term true profitability, since it is 
considered a reliable tool for prudential monitoring by nowadays central monetary 
authorities. 
On such long time series a number of anomalous observations could cause 
distortions in results. This is especially true as for some sub-periods (in particular 
the 1966-1973 one) and traditional profitability ratios are concerned; that is due to 
high inflation periods and/or the introduction of tighter regulatory rules on 
banking activity, particularly when these latter concern main risk ratios. Graphs in 
Appendix A, for instance, show sharp and sudden falls in 1925 and in 1947, when 
new bank laws or specific credit policies were adopted by central authorities. 
As literature points out that significant delays generally occur between credit 
and business cycles, the analysis is also taking into account temporal lags usually 
recorded between banks operations and growth or depression phases. Eventually, 7  7   
we used a vector auto-regression model to estimate correlations between banking 
and macroeconomic variables. 
 
3. Some stylised facts on the Italian banking system: cycles and crisis on the long 
run 
In the long run the Italian banking system structure seems to be characterised 
by two major dynamics, whilst financial markets were playing a minor role as 
studies on quantitative series demonstrate (Biscaini Cotula and Ciocca, 1979)
5. 
Since its gradual formation in the late Nineteenth century and till the mid-1930s 
the Italian financial system was bank-oriented and characterised by the major role 
exerted by universal banks and issuing banks, among which the Bank of Italy was 
the largest one. After the 1936 Banking Act the Italian banking system was 
reorganised according to credit specialisation principles and the Bank of Italy 
ceased, even formally, to be a private company. While German-style universal 
banks became commercial banks, about two-third of the banking system fell under 
control of the State, either via the Treasury, or via the State-owned conglomerate 
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). Nevertheless, the financial structure 
remained bank-oriented and financial markets were generally weak and 
ineffective, while long term credit was provided by banklike special institutions, 
such as Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) and Mediobanca (Piluso, 1999). 
A sort of dualism in terms of size and functions appears to emerge from this 
broad framework all over the period. On the one hand, the three main German-
style mixed banks (Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, and Banco di 
Roma) financed the largest industrial firms operating in the most advanced 
technological sectors such as steel, electricity and automotive, thus probably 
supporting the industrialisation process (Gerschenkron, 1962; Cohen, 1967). On 
the other one, a great number of small or medium sized local banks (cooperative 
and savings banks) financed and supported small manufacturing firms (Conti, 
1999). Besides, up to 1926, when the government assigned to the Bank of Italy 
 
5   Italy’s FIR grew from 0.4 to 1.0 between 1881 and 1971. The financial assets issued by 
banks as a share of the total amount of financial assets declined from 89% in 1913 to 81% in 1951. 8  8   
the monopoly of issuing, this institute played also a relevant role vis-à-vis 
manufacturing firms (Bonelli, 1991). Moreover a geographical dualism was also 
relevant over the whole period (A’Hearn, 2005). 
What do we know about credit cycles in Italy? We have a number of 
examples of credit crunch and banking crises. According to the literature, we can 
recognise some major financial crises: after the 1873 crack, a dramatic crisis 
occurred in the early 1890s when Banca Romana, a minor issuing bank, failed and 
the two largest Italian banks, Credito Mobiliare and Banca Generale, collapsed 
(Confalonieri, 1975); in 1907 a financial crisis harshly involved Società Bancaria 
Italiana, a medium sized mixed bank based in Milan, threatening the stability of 
the system (Bonelli, 1971); after the first world war, in 1921, the largest mixed 
banks were in a turmoil and Banca Italiana di Sconto failed, while Banco di Roma 
was rescued by the Bank of Italy (Falchero, 1990); in 1927-1928, even as a 
consequence of a restrictive monetary policy, a high number of cooperative banks 
failed; eventually, in the early 1930s, largest mixed banks were in a situation of 
relatively illiquidity, that convinced the authorities to intervene with a massive 
rescue operation (Toniolo, 1993 and 1995; Confalonieri, 1994). 
As a consequence of the lack of data on loan losses, we can try to use some 
proxies to assess in which measure business and credit cycles are related to each 
other. We chose the growth rate of real total assets as an indicator of the growth 
rate of activities of the banking system, i.e. as an indicator of overall credit 
supply. Other two ratios can be indicators of specific credit supply, that’s to say of 
credit to firms: i) loans on total assets; ii) loans on current accounts, deposits and 
other liabilities. We found the first ratio appropriate to evaluate credit crunch 
phenomena. Now, let us have a look at Graph 1, plotting real GDP growth and 
real total asset growth. Even at a first glance, the graph suggests the existence, at 
least in part, of relevant relations between business and credit cycles. 
We can observe both some regularities and some anomalies. Above all, some 
anomalies clearly appear in relation to the two major opposite peaks reached both 9  9   
by real gross domestic product growth and real total assets growth
6. They are 
related to the exogenous shocks of the second world war and to the subsequent 
recovery and high inflation period. The other most relevant peaks concern the 
total assets series (1905, 1919, 1948, 1966). We observe three main peaks reached 
by real total assets growth rate: two after each world war – due to a high inflation 
period – and one in the mid-1960s. The main feature of this series is the apparent 
change in its dynamics occurred around 1934-1936, consistent with the hypothesis 
of an institutional break, namely the new Banking Act of 1936 and its 
consequences
7. Before 1936, credit cycles does not seem to have a homogeneous 
behaviour. Up to 1907 we observe a countercyclical movement of the series with 
two exceptions at the beginning of the period (1894 to 1896). At the turn of the 
century the banking cycle even precedes and sustains the economic cycle, with a 
positive peak in 1905 related to the stock exchange boom, followed by a dramatic 
slump between 1906 and 1907, pre-empting the stock exchange crash of this latter 
year. Afterwards, until 1920, the banking system seems to be procyclical, even if 
with some slight delay, sometimes following the economic cycle and some others 
anticipating it. In the interwar period, raw data do not draw a clear cut picture. 
Asynchronous movements must be understood in their real meaning, although it 
seems sufficiently clear that curves fluctuate in opposite directions. At a first 
glance it appears that banking cycle follows the economic cycle with a certain lag. 
But taking in account the fact that the 1920s were a period of expansionary 
monetary policies and relative high inflation, it could be argued that the banking 
cycle was able to anticipate and move the real one, except after 1933-1934. As we 
will see in the next paragraph our estimates seem to be consistent with this 
hypothesis. After 1933-1934 universal banks bail-out and banking reorganisation, 
promoted and realised by Iri on behalf of the government, banking cycle appears 
to become, so to speak, a-cyclical until the war’s eve. Most relevant effects of the 
 
6   The series of the real GDP per capita growth rate and GDP growth rate have more or less 
the same dynamics, with few and minor differences. 
7    Even if we lack data for 1937 and 1938, it seems clear that, after the new law, a 
smoothing process is backing this series. Probably this process is due to the new Banking Act and 
to a stronger control by monetary authorities. We will come on that point later. 10  10   
new Banking Act were experienced since the post-war recovery and during the so-
called «economic miracle» of the 1950s and 1960s. In this decades the banking 
system was predominantly State-owned
8 (Ferri, 1993), Donato Menichella and 
Guido Carli, governors of Bank of Italy, exerted a strict control over banks 
activities, even through discretionary powers (Gigliobianco, Piluso and Toniolo, 
1999), and foster a Keynesian-oriented economic policy (Spinelli and Fratianni, 
1996). Thus, it could be argued that a better macroeconomic performance of the 

























































































































































































real GDP growth dtotalassets_sys  
Graph 1 – Real GDP growth rate and banking system total assets real growth rate (1890-
1975). 
 
Graph 2 plots real GDP growth with real total assets growth of (commercial) 
banks, which included, until 1936, universal banks, whose share was about 20% 
of the system’s total assets, and excludes savings and cooperative banks. Here 
main trends are generally similar to those observed for the banking system as a 
whole, but they appear to have more marked peaks. Even after the second world 
 
8    After the banking bail-outs major Italian banks became State-owned, directly by the 
Treasury or indirectly by the State-owned holding Iri, whilst savings banks (casse di risparmio) 
were strictly controlled by local authorities. 11  11   
war, when the banking system was moving along more constant dynamics, banks 
real total assets evolution seems to follow a slightly higher variation rate. Of 
course, sharper cyclical movements are observable for the period prior to 1936. 
During the early 1900s, for instance, banks total assets experienced an 
astonishingly brusque boom followed, from 1906-1907, by a sudden fall, quite 
tougher than that suffered by the whole banking system. This was probably an 
effect of the participation of mixed banks, as insiders, to the financial markets 
boom during the precedent years. This awkward fall in the real total assets growth 
rate is consistent with what we know at micro level, i.e. the failure of Società 
Bancaria Italiana. After the first world war banks total assets increase reached the 
highest peak before the crisis of the subsequent years. In particular, as the Bank of 
Italy opted for a robust revaluation of the lira with «quota novanta» (90 liras per 
pound sterling), a strong decrease in the growth rate of total assets occurred 
between 1927 and 1933, before the Great Depression and in correspondence with 
the deflationary effects of the monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Italy. A 
feeble and only temporary resilience was not sufficient to couple the credit cycle 
to the real economic one till the late 1930s. After the second world war and the 
recovery period, the banking regulation seems to have had a significant impact on 
banks, as noted above about the entire system. Sharp falls in the growth rate of 
total assets disappeared, the only exception being 1964, when a sudden increase in 
interest rates was decided by Guido Carli, governor of Bank of Italy. The 
smoothing trend of banking cyclical movements during the 1950s and 1960s 
seems to confirm the fear expressed with a harsh remark by Giuseppe Toeplitz – 
the mighty managing director of Banca Commerciale Italiana – during the early 
1930s crisis, that the government wanted to transform Italian universal banks in 
«savings banks» (Confalonieri, 1994) (see graph 2). 
























































































































































































real GDP growth dtotalassets_banks  
Graph 2 – Real GDP growth rate and banks total assets real growth rate (1890-1975). 
 
A direct comparison of total assets growth rate of the Italian banking system 
and its main components can help to verify and specify Toeplitz’ concerns (Graph 
3). Actually, before the Bank Act of 1936 we can note that cooperative banks and 
savings banks were moving along their specific cyclical paths, with some apparent 
divergence from the general one. Until the mid-1930s, or up to the end of the 
second world war, the semi-dotted line representing the cooperative banks 
suggests that in several cycles this group experienced a more robust growth than 
the whole banking system, here shown by the solid line, while the dotted line (for 
savings banks) underwent minor fluctuations around the cycles before 1914 and 
tended to maintain high values in the 1920s. On the contrary, cooperative banks 
went below the banking system line during the 1920s, because of tough effects of 
their difficulties and, eventually, their crisis at the end of the decade. In 1927-
1928 a number of cooperative catholic banks, deeply involved in long term loans, 
failed. In the 1930s this group of small and medium sized local banks, probably 
acting as «pocket mixed banks», fluctuated beneath the values reached by the 
system as a whole, while savings banks had the best performance. Afterwards, a 13  13   


















































































































































































dtotalassets_sys dtotalassets_coop dtotalassets_savings  
Graph 3 – Growth rate of total assets of the banking system as a whole compared with the 
same variable of cooperative banks and savings banks (1890-1975). 
 
As most cooperative banks acted as «pocket mixed banks» their real total 
assets growth rate often fluctuated in a similar way, and on similar values, as 
banks. After the second world war curves appear to be flatter as a result of a 
smoothing process and of the structural change occurred in the mid-1930s, due to 
the institutional break represented by the Bank Act of 1936 (see graph 4). 


















































































































































































dtotalassets_banks dtotalassets_coop dtotalassets_savings  
Graph 4 – Growth rate of total assets of banks, cooperative banks and savings banks (1890-
1975). 
 
An institutional break could be recognised also in Graph 5, which plots the 
ratio of total loans to total assets on the left axis and the ratios of investments on 
GDP and industrial investments (plants and machinery) on GDP on the right axis. 
With the exception of a strong upward trend of the former ratio in the late 1890s 
and early 1900s, we observe a long run almost stable trend from 1907 to the late 
1930s, even if with some interesting peaks before and after the first world war. It 
is worthy to note that the two major opposite peaks of the investments on GDP 
ratio, reached during the 1920s, are not followed by the banking variable. This 
latter seems to be more stable than the others and similar movements, if any, are 
related to the ratio of industrial investments on GDP (see graph 5). 
































































































































































































loans/total assets investments/gdp industrial investments/gdp  
Graph 5 – Series of ratios of loans on total assets of the banking system, investments on 
GDP, and investments in plants and machinery (industrial) on GDP (1890-1975). 
 
Again, after the structural change occurred in the mid-1930s, these ratios 
appear to be less characterised by strong fluctuations and peaks, even considering 
the sharp and sudden fall of 1964, when the Bank of Italy tightened the credit 
supply through the lever of the interest rate and chose a monetary policy centred 
on a «stop and go» strategy, aimed to grant both growth and price stability in the 
medium term. 
In the long run, banking cycles and business cycles seem to be characterised 
by co-movements: the banking system is apparently moving together with 
business cycles. As we will see below, that is confirmed by our VAR estimates. 
Nevertheless, some specifications are due in order to explain both regularities and 
changes in main dynamics. 
In the first sub-period (1890-1936ca), macroeconomic growth depends on 
aggregate investments largely driven by credit supply, as shown in graph 5: even 
if the loans on total assets ratio (bold line) shows some fluctuations, it is quite 
clear that after the 1894-1895 turning point the overall credit supply grew steadily 
till the 1907 crisis, then becoming rather stable on high values until 1934. That is, 
the macroeconomic process appears to be largely explained by aggregate 16  16   
investments: investments are credit led and income per capita growth is indirectly 
driven by credit supply. This could help explaining why over the sub-period our 
proxy for credit supply (loans on total assets) is quite stable in comparison to 
more fluctuating investments. Notwithstanding some up and down turns, this 
variable was in effect able to lead investments and income growth. This is 
consistent with Alexander Gerschenkron’s hypothesis about the role played by 
German-style mixed banks in the Italian industrialisation (Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Federico and Toniolo, 1991). 
After 1936, the Banking Act partly modified the role of major banks. Our 
estimates confirm banking system procyclicality even in this second sub-period, 
but our series suggest an interesting change in the nature of the relationship 
between credit cycles and business cycles. Firstly, the cycle appears less volatile 
than before and, second, the banking system almost perfectly replicate 
fluctuations of the income variable. Credit cycles appear to be income-led via 
investments and a new mechanism gains ground: overall investments, as a share 
of aggregate demand, are somehow able to seize the total credit supply. This is 
particularly consistent with what we know about the role of major banks during 
the 1950s and 1960s: in this period Italian largest banks were not able to lead 
investments and credit demand by manufacturing firms, but, on the contrary, they 
were strongly depending on industrial demand (Gigliobianco, Piluso and Toniolo, 
1999). 
This picture helps us explaining regularities in the long run and more relevant 
institutional changes. Probably, Gerschenkron was right in stressing the pro-active 
role played by mixed banks in the industrialisation process, whilst afterwards, 
when the Bank Act of 1936 inhibiting universal banking became operational, the 
banking system was not able to lead investments and income growth any more. In 
the post second world war period, mixed banks were substituted by different 
factors of growth. From the late 1940s, the Italian macroeconomic performance 
became more depending on public spending, as an increasing share of the 
aggregate demand, and on total exports led by the international growth. Thus, 17  17   
credit cycles became increasingly more related to investments and income growth 
than they were before 1936. 
 
4. Was Gerschenkron right? Evidence from VAR estimates 
To check the hypotheses and suggestions resulting from the analysis carried 
out in the previous section we also decided to apply vector auto-regression (VAR) 
analysis to a set of relevant variables. VAR methodology, in fact, is a flexible and 
non-deterministic method which permit to estimate whether a bilateral causality 
occur among phenomena described by our variables (Sims, 1980): that would give 
better insights on the kind of relation existing between banking and business 
cycles. We identified a set of bank specific indicators (relative to the entire 
system) and another one for macroeconomic variables. Business cycle indicators 
include the real GDP annual variation rate (DGDP) – the most direct measure of 
aggregate economic activity - and the real investments annual variation rate 
(DINV). As for the latter, we considered both investments as a whole, and their 
components: industrial investments, constructions and public works. Then we 
considered some bank specific indicators, first of all ROE and ROA as rough 
proxies of banks’ screening capability in absence of more specific indicators, such 
as bad loans to total loans ratios
9. A positive and quite durable impact of such 
variables on investments and GDP growth would confirm a procyclical behaviour 
of banks, whereas a negative sign in their parameters would indicate 
countercyclicality. It has to be noted, anyway, that such indicators could most 
often be misleading because of their dependence from publicly recorded profits, 
which many studies at firm level have confirmed to be commonly understated
10, 
especially before the adoption of more stringent accountancy criteria in the last 
 
9   In fact, data on bad loans are not available till very recent years and never appear in our 
sources. 
10   See for instance Confalonieri 1981, vol. 3, and 1994, on Italian universal banks’ balance 
sheets. One of the most striking examples of this phenomenon is portrayed by Bouvier 1999, p. 
164 where he quotes a letter of 1864 by an officier of the Crédit Lyonnais to the bank’s managing 
director, Henri Germain, in which the former explained the differences among the 3 different 
income statements he is submitting: one for shareholders, another for the board of directors, and 
the latter and most exhaustive one for the executive committee. 18  18   
20-30 years (Teti, 1999). The practice of profits’ understating and of 
accumulating hidden reserves was not principally connected with fiscal reasons, 
but rather with signalling policies, aimed to smooth variations in performance 
which could mine the public’s trust in bank’s soundness (Rassegna dell’Abi, 
1947, p. 71). At this regard, graphs A.1 to A.4 seem to confirm that such a 
behaviour was generally spread among Italian banks, both taking into account the 
whole banking system, and each of its three components (banks, savings banks, 
cooperative banks). That’s why we introduced another measure of profitability: 
the ratio of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital to total assets (TIER), that is, as already said, 
a possible kind of capital adequacy ratio. This variable is like to be less affected 
by biases on understated profits, since it comprehend all reserves and retained 
profits, of all kinds and for all purposes. We then considered the real total assets 
growth (DASS), which can be thought of as an indicator of the banking cycle. 
Eventually, the ratio of loans to total assets (LOAN) would represent the banking 
system’s «investment cycle». Again, significant and positive estimated 
coefficients of these two indicators will confirm banks’ procyclicality, whereas 
negative signs in their parameters would suggest a countercyclical behaviour of 
banks. Some of the considered variables’ series being non-stationary, we took 
their first differences, which satisfied homoschedasticity conditions: this was the 
case for ROE, ROA, LOAN, and TIER. 
The econometric analysis is carried out using a four-variables VAR model, 
with two lags for each variable, of the type: 
 
Xt = c + A1 Xt-1 + A2 Xt-2 + et 
 
Variables considered are the real GDP annual growth (DGDP), the real 
investments annual growth (DINV), the first difference of the ratio of loans to 
total assets (LOAN1), and, at turn, the real annual total assets growth (DASS), the 
(first-differenced) ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to total assets (TIER1), and the 
first difference of ROE (ROE1) and ROA (ROA1). 
VAR estimates for ROE and ROA gave very poor results, confirming 19  19   
warnings already mentioned in section 2 about these variables’ reliability. For 
most of the equations of these estimates, in fact, we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses that coefficients are jointly equal to zero; moreover, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that each regression’s coefficient is individually equal to zero 
either. Thus we run a VAR on the same model using TIER1, our more reliable 
proxy for banks’ screening capability: results of the estimated equations are given 
in Table 1. Although the coefficients of three out of four equations are jointly 
significant at 1% level, capital adequacy ratio turns out to be uncorrelated with the 
other variables at any lags, but in one case: TIER1 is strongly and negatively 
correlated with investments at the second lag, being nevertheless positively and 
quite highly correlated with itself at the first lag, at 10% level of significance. 
Evidence on profitability and on capital adequacy ratios seems to confirm 
qualitative evidences and arguments which have pointed out the widespread 
adoption by banks of window dressing techniques and signalling policies. In fact, 
while ROE and ROA resulted in being inadequate proxies for banks screening 
capability, evidence obtained for TIER confirms our hypothesis that effects of 
misallocation on banks performance can be noticed only in the medium, or even 
the long, run. 
Both variables concerning investments (DINV and LOAN1) have positive 
and very significant impact on real GDP growth (eq. 2): DINV is significant only 
at the second lag, suggesting a delay in the effect of new investments on growth; 
in the very short period (first lag), then, LOAN1 has a relevant impact on the real 
cycle, being in its turn positively slightly influenced by the immediately previous 
investments cycle (Table 1, eq. 4, and Table 2, eq. 4). 
Table 2 presents results of the VAR estimate substituting TIER1 with DASS, 
our proxy for the overall banking cycle. Coefficients of all four equations are 
jointly significant at 1% level, as well as most coefficients taken individually. R-
squared values are quite high especially as for eq. 1 and eq. 3, the two most 
relevant ones to our study. Eq. 2 confirms our idea that the banking cycle is not 
depending on the overall GDP growth, while investments show a significant 
impact on banking (at 1% level); opposite signs of DINV coefficients show that 20  20   
investments are characterised by differed returns, and seem to be coherent with 
what is maintained by recent historical works, which find a medium to long term 
lending attitude by Italian banks – through the roll-over of credits – even after the 
Banking Act of 1936 (De Cecco, 1997; Brambilla, 1998; Gigliobianco, Piluso, 
Toniolo, 1999; Brambilla and Bussière forthcoming). As expected LOAN1 has a 
strong positive and significant impact on DASS at the first lag. That seems to 
underline the relevance of screening and monitoring activities by banks, as 
pointed out in theoretical literature on credit and financial systems (Fama, 1983; 
Diamond and Dybvig, 1985; Levine, 1997; Goodhart 1989; Calomiris, 1993). 
Such an interpretation appears coherent with the positive and significant relation 
emerging in eq. 4, where LOAN1 are depending on their lagged value at the first 
lag, suggesting that banks’ past lending policies, at least in the short term, have a 
certain persistent impact on their ability to make performing loans in the future. 
Let us take into consideration eq. 1. Here, again, the investments cycle has a 
significant impact on the dependent variable, with opposite signs, that can be 
interpreted – as in the case of the banking cycle – as an indication of differed 
returns of investments. Banking variables are both significant – though only 
DASS at both lags; this latter show alternate signs (lag 1 positive, lag 2 negative), 
probably due to a minor reverting, pointing out a misalignment between the two 
cycles. Although it is difficult to say whether such misalignment can be 
interpreted as a confirmation of Schumpeter’s theory on business cycles, 
according to whom banks anticipate and foster this latter, nevertheless it seems 
that coefficients’ values for DASS and LOAN1 at first lag confirm a strong direct 
effect of banking on economic growth. These is especially evident as far as banks’ 
loans are concerned. 
The same can be seen for the investments cycle in eq. 3: whereas real total 
assets growth coefficients are highly significant only at the second lag, they seem 
to confirm the misalignment already observed in eq. 1, which here results even 
more pronounced (lag 2 coefficient in eq. 3 is roughly the double than in eq. 1); 
LOAN1 coefficients, too, present the same alternate signs, with higher levels (up 
to three-fold than in eq. 1), suggesting an even stronger procyclical behaviour of 21  21   
the banking system towards investments, thus strengthening the «Schumpeterian» 
interpretation. 
Estimating this same model substituting DINV with each one of the three 
variables rappresenting its components – namely industrial investments (DIND), 
constructions (DHOUSES) and public works (DPW) – does not really change the 
picture (see Tables 3 to 5). As expected, coefficients’ signs and significance are 
the same for investments’ components as well as for the aggregate value, with an 
exception: LOAN1 coefficients at the second lag are not significant in the case of 
investments in constructions (DHOUSES) and in public works (DPW) – though 
they show the same signs as in estimates concerning DIND and DINV – probably 
suggesting a shorter effect of banking activity on these variables. A certain 
interest, then, has the relationship of each of the investments variables with banks’ 
loans (LOAN1) in eq. 4 of all three estimates: the overall rate of investments 
showed a positive relation with this variable at the first lag (the second lag 
coefficient being non significant, see Table 2, eq. 4), while industrial investments 
(DIND) and investments in public works (DPW) are, on the contrary, totally 
uncorrelated with LOAN1; only constructions (DHOUSES) show the same 
behaviour of DINV. Such a result may, on the one hand, be interpreted as 
coherent with interpretations of the overall structure of Italian banking system that 
stressed its «Gerschenkronian» nature, i.e. that are banks which lead the business 
cycle, not the other way round; on the other hand, then, this evidence seems to 
confirm the relevance of constructions cycles in mobilizing credit and then the 
whole economy, as suggested in classical literature on Italian banking (Pantaleoni 
1895; Luzzatto, 1968). Low values in DHOUSES coefficients, however, might be 
due to the fact that the present dataset do not include, yet, banklike institutions, 
which – especially from the 1930s onwards – were charged with medium to long 
term financing, in particular to public utilities and public works (De Cecco and 
Asso, 1994; Piluso, 1999). 
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5. Conclusions 
This first attempt to approach the issue of banks’ procyclicality in the long 
run allows to draw only some preliminary and tentative conclusions, that anyway 
do not seem trivial. First of all, the institutional break represented by the Banking 
Act of 1936 and its consequences seems to have caused a structural change in the 
banking series, as seen in graphs A.1 to A.4, a change whose nature and impact 
deserves additional analysis. In contrast with recent literature on banks’ 
procyclicality, economic performance variables – ROE, ROA – turned out to be 
uncorrelated with the economic cycle and, moreover, with the investments cycle, 
both taken in its aggregate value, and in its components (DIND, DHOUSES, 
DPW). Nonetheless, TIER inverse correlation with investments confirms both 
procyclical attitude of banks, which tends to lessen prudential controls in upturns, 
thus worsening their capital adequacy ratios, and the idea that – due to window 
dressing techniques – banks’ allocation and screening capabilities are better 
observed in the medium term. 
However, since most of the recent literature on banks procyclicality is 
concerned with the last 20 to 30 years, while our series are limited to the early 
1970s, it is possible that changes (institutional or others) that are likely to have 
occurred in the most recent years could help in explaining differences in findings 
about profits. This is an incentive to proceed further in our research, e.g. by 
widening our scope to some other relevant national cases, on the one hand, and to 
prolong our series, on the other. VAR estimates, nevertheless, seem to confirm a 
certain procyclical behaviour by the banking system as a whole. We can interpret 
such behaviour as «Gerschenkronian» and even – at least to a certain extent – as 
«Schumpeterian», since industrial investments are relatively strongly and 
persistently affected, especially, by banks’ loans. 
Such results urge us to widen the scope of the analysis to comprehend other 
aggregates and macro variables, too. In fact, we expect to get more insights from 
the analysis of universal banks behaviour – both pre and post-1936 legislation – 
and from the study of the main components of the banking system, namely 
savings banks, commonly believed to be countercyclical, and cooperative banks, 23  23   
for which qualitative evidence is less uniform. We intend also to work specifically 
on the relation between the banking system – and its components – behaviour and 
monetary variables, which have been deliberately let apart here. 
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Graph A.2 – Roe and capital net worth of the Italian banks, logarithmic scale (1890-1973). 



































































































































































































































































































































































Graph A.4 – Roe and capital net worth of the Italian savings banks, logarithmic scale (1890-1973). 
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Appendix B. Vector auto-regression estimates 
Table 1 
Included observations: 77 after adjustments; Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
 TIER1SIS  DGDP  DINV  LOAN1SIS 
   
TIER1SIS(-1)   0.232814   0.654940   2.054077   0.440866 
   (0.11919)   (1.86023)   (4.57939)   (0.49131) 
  [ 1.95324] *  [ 0.35207]  [ 0.44855]  [ 0.89733] 
        
TIER1SIS(-2)   0.049610  -1.391267  -9.995408  -0.025507 
   (0.11590)   (1.80890)   (4.45302)   (0.47775) 
  [ 0.42803]  [-0.76912]  [-2.24464] **  [-0.05339] 
        
DGDP(-1)   0.006815   0.064056  -0.494187  -0.163485 
   (0.01302)   (0.20324)   (0.50033)   (0.05368) 
  [ 0.52335]  [ 0.31517]  [-0.98772]  [-3.04561] *** 
        
DGDP(-2) -0.018584  -0.640842  -2.174678  -0.044884 
   (0.01324)   (0.20670)   (0.50884)   (0.05459) 
  [-1.40314]  [-3.10032] ***  [-4.27377] ***  [-0.82217] 
        
DINV(-1) -0.003786  -0.081154  -0.051357    0.058384 
   (0.00476)   (0.07421)   (0.18270)   (0.01960) 
  [-0.79616]  [-1.09351]  [-0.28111]  [ 2.97867] *** 
        
DINV(-2)   0.004541   0.154704   0.578848   0.008683 
   (0.00495)   (0.07732)   (0.19034)   (0.02042) 
  [ 0.91654]  [ 2.00080] **  [ 3.04107] ***  [ 0.42520] 
        
LOAN1SIS(-1)   0.030896   2.520581   5.048724   0.358512 
   (0.03676)   (0.57365)   (1.41216)   (0.15151) 
  [ 0.84056]  [ 4.39395] ***  [ 3.57517] ***  [ 2.36631] ** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-2)   0.037418  -0.529448  -2.028235  -0.074796 
   (0.03973)   (0.62001)   (1.52628)   (0.16375) 
 [  0.94189]  [-0.85394]  [-1.32887]  [-0.45677] 
        
C  -0.121564   5.547457   13.00895   0.526259 
   (0.09802)   (1.52985)   (3.76606)   (0.40405) 
  [-1.24014]  [ 3.62615] ***  [ 3.45426] ***  [ 1.30246] 
   
 R-squared   0.163079   0.475378   0.541244   0.347103 
 Adj. R-squared   0.064618   0.413658   0.487273   0.270291 
 Sum sq. resids   36.25585   8830.955   53516.36   615.9974 
 S.E. equation   0.730188   11.39592   28.05361   3.009782 
 F-statistic   1.656275   7.702140 ***   10.02838 ***   4.518897 *** 
 Mean dependent  -0.215014   4.347187   8.865348   0.203951 
 S.D. dependent   0.754988   14.88243   39.17832   3.523387 30  30   
Table 2 
 Included observations: 77 after adjustments; Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
 DGDP  DASS_SIS  DINV  LOAN1SIS 
   
DGDP(-1)   0.093747  -0.003004  -0.322183  -0.160097 
   (0.17427)   (0.18570)   (0.46490)   (0.04994) 
  [ 0.53794]  [-0.01618]  [-0.69302]  [-3.20589] *** 
        
DGDP(-2) -0.416294  -0.229040  -1.551120    0.009726 
   (0.18771)   (0.20003)   (0.50076)   (0.05379) 
  [-2.21769] **  [-1.14504]  [-3.09751] ***  [ 0.18081] 
        
DASS_SIS(-1)   0.365227   0.553205   0.541852   0.073697 
   (0.13923)   (0.14836)   (0.37142)   (0.03990) 
  [ 2.62321] **  [ 3.72875] ***  [ 1.45887]  [ 1.84718] * 
        
DASS_SIS(-2) -0.695879  -0.591509  -1.590226  -0.147147 
   (0.12453)   (0.13270)   (0.33221)   (0.03569) 
  [-5.58799] ***  [-4.45750] ***  [-4.78682] ***  [-4.12349] *** 
        
DINV(-1) -0.192438  -0.310947  -0.255738    0.033854 
   (0.06430)   (0.06852)   (0.17153)   (0.01842) 
  [-2.99291] ***  [-4.53832] ***  [-1.49095]  [ 1.83740] * 
        
DINV(-2)   0.265797   0.249507   0.775392   0.028108 
   (0.07492)   (0.07983)   (0.19986)   (0.02147) 
  [ 3.54781] ***  [ 3.12537] ***  [ 3.87970] ***  [ 1.30928] 
        
LOAN1SIS(-1)   2.437188   2.677564   4.851313   0.376821 
   (0.49065)   (0.52283)   (1.30889)   (0.14060) 
  [ 4.96729] ***  [ 5.12128] ***  [ 3.70643] ***  [ 2.68014] *** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-2) -0.861980  -0.152228  -2.693841  -0.103960 
   (0.53852)   (0.57384)   (1.43660)   (0.15432) 
 [-1.60065]  [-0.26528]  [-1.87515]  *  [-0.67368] 
        
C   6.798905   7.742699   18.31434   0.695377 
   (1.39920)   (1.49098)   (3.73260)   (0.40095) 
  [ 4.85915] ***  [ 5.19304] ***  [ 4.90659] ***  [ 1.73434] ** 
   
 R-squared   0.641110   0.560230   0.631460   0.474219 
 Adj. R-squared   0.598888   0.508492   0.588103   0.412363 
 Sum sq. resids   6041.185   6859.724   42992.18   496.0653 
 S.E. equation   9.425548   10.04382   25.14434   2.700940 
 F-statistic   15.18416 ***   10.82828 ***   14.56399 ***   7.666436 *** 
 Mean dependent   4.347187   6.569981   8.865348   0.203951 
 S.D. dependent   14.88243   14.32629   39.17832   3.523387 31  31   
Table 3 
Included observations: 77 after adjustments; Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
   
 DGDP  DIND  DASS_SIS  LOAN1SIS 
   
DGDP(-1)    0.115206 -0.087728   0.044071  -0.150887 
   (0.17682)   (0.46062)   (0.18140)   (0.04976) 
  [ 0.65154]  [-0.19046]  [ 0.24295]  [-3.03236] *** 
        
DGDP(-2) -0.304944  -1.307646  -0.156481  -0.010660 
   (0.18802)   (0.48979)   (0.19288)   (0.05291) 
  [-1.62188] [-2.66979]  *** [-0.81127]  [-0.20148] 
        
DIND(-1) -0.192898  -0.205025  -0.330847    0.030762 
   (0.06587)   (0.17160)   (0.06758)   (0.01854) 
  [-2.92835] ***  [-1.19478]  [-4.89583] ***  [ 1.65947] 
        
DIND(-2)   0.238107   0.758290   0.263169   0.035678 
   (0.07820)   (0.20371)   (0.08022)   (0.02201) 
  [ 3.04490] ***   [ 3.72240] ***  [ 3.28048] ***  [ 1.62128] 
        
DASS_SIS(-1)   0.312217   0.501252   0.532436   0.081139 
   (0.13955)   (0.36352)   (0.14316)   (0.03927) 
  [ 2.23738] **  [ 1.37888]  [ 3.71923] ***  [ 2.06620] ** 
        
DASS_SIS(-2) -0.670797  -1.591926  -0.581542  -0.146715 
   (0.12575)   (0.32759)   (0.12901)   (0.03539) 
  [-5.33418] ***  [-4.85945] ***  [-4.50776] ***  [-4.14586] *** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-1)   2.679481   4.505037   2.887654   0.348930 
   (0.50289)   (1.31005)   (0.51591)   (0.14152) 
  [ 5.32812] ***  [ 3.43882] ***  [ 5.59722] ***  [ 2.46561] ** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-2) -1.042401  -3.581520  -0.526704  -0.127040 
   (0.57219)   (1.49056)   (0.58699)   (0.16102) 
  [-1.82179] *  [-2.40280] **  [-0.89729]  [-0.78898] 
        
C   6.685533   17.17701   7.500008   0.632744 
   (1.44554)   (3.76566)   (1.48294)   (0.40679) 
  [ 4.62495] ***  [ 4.56149] ***  [ 5.05751] ***  [ 1.55547] 
   
 R-squared   0.629115   0.624814   0.578777   0.475987 
 Adj. R-squared   0.585481   0.580674   0.529221   0.414339 
 Sum sq. resids   6243.104   42366.78   6570.418   494.3971 
 S.E. equation   9.581772   24.96079   9.829740   2.696395 
 F-statistic   14.41815 ***   14.15540 ***   11.67933 ***   7.720985 *** 
 Mean dependent   4.347187   9.619147   6.569981   0.203951 
 S.D. dependent   14.88243   38.54627   14.32629   3.523387 32  32   
Table 4 
 Included observations: 77 after adjustments; Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
    
 DGDP  DHOUSES  DASS_SIS  LOAN1SIS 
    
DGDP(-1) -0.111198  -1.219471  -0.308427  -0.143196 
   (0.15711)   (0.41591)   (0.16905)   (0.04172) 
  [-0.70776]  [-2.93205] ***  [-1.82447] **  [-3.43199] *** 
        
DGDP(-2) -0.157917  -0.323671  -0.048769    0.051969 
   (0.16808)   (0.44495)   (0.18085)   (0.04464) 
 [-0.93951]  [-0.72743]  [-0.26966]  [  1.16426] 
        
DHOUSES(-1)  -0.118543   0.102595 -0.219020    0.035969 
   (0.06501)   (0.17209)   (0.06995)   (0.01726) 
  [-1.82346] *  [ 0.59615]  [-3.13114] ***  [ 2.08343] ** 
        
DHOUSES(-2)   0.163283   0.326128   0.174544   0.019895 
   (0.07209)   (0.19083)   (0.07757)   (0.01914) 
  [ 2.26503] **  [ 1.70897] *  [ 2.25028] **  [ 1.03920] 
        
DASS_SIS(-1)   0.274553   0.207269   0.508082   0.057199 
   (0.14642)   (0.38759)   (0.15754)   (0.03888) 
  [ 1.87515] *  [ 0.53476]  [ 3.22511] ***  [ 1.47106] 
        
DASS_SIS(-2) -0.667535  -1.011272  -0.535648  -0.160920 
   (0.13472)   (0.35663)   (0.14495)   (0.03578) 
  [-4.95501] ***  [-2.83565] ***  [-3.69530] ***  [-4.49792] *** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-1)   2.629425   5.094307   2.695999   0.419676 
   (0.49607)   (1.31319)   (0.53375)   (0.13174) 
  [ 5.30053] ***  [ 3.87935] ***  [ 5.05101] ***  [ 3.18569] *** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-2) -0.475002  -1.452915    0.225838  -0.095536 
   (0.55900)   (1.47979)   (0.60147)   (0.14845) 
 [-0.84973]  [-0.98184]  [  0.37547]  [-0.64355] 
        
C   7.117863   16.41115   8.033155   0.657761 
   (1.50155)   (3.97490)   (1.61563)   (0.39876) 
  [ 4.74033] ***  [ 4.12869] ***  [ 4.97215] ***  [ 1.64952] 
    
 R-squared   0.588563   0.459242   0.485975   0.482311 
 Adj. R-squared   0.540159   0.395623   0.425502   0.421406 
 Sum sq. resids   6925.705   48532.69   8017.975   488.4309 
 S.E. equation   10.09201   26.71546   10.85870   2.680076 
 F-statistic   12.15932 ***   7.218672 ***   8.036177 ***   7.919125 *** 
 Mean dependent   4.347187   9.558921   6.569981   0.203951 
 S.D. dependent   14.88243   34.36441   14.32629   3.523387 33  33   
Table 5 
 Included observations: 77 after adjustments; Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
    
 DGDP  DPW  DASS_SIS  LOAN1SIS 
    
DGDP(-1)   0.067312  -0.679178  -0.151026  -0.130689 
   (0.16807)   (0.60930)   (0.19220)   (0.04979) 
  [ 0.40050]  [-1.11469]  [-0.78576]  [-2.62500] ** 
        
DGDP(-2) -0.418391  -2.033176  -0.129793    0.045021 
   (0.18054)   (0.65450)   (0.20646)   (0.05348) 
  [-2.31746] **  [-3.10643] ***  [-0.62865]  [ 0.84184] 
        
DPW(-1) -0.139086  -0.246340  -0.172022    0.014615 
   (0.04445)   (0.16115)   (0.05084)   (0.01317) 
  [-3.12889] ***  [-1.52862]  [-3.38389] ***  [ 1.10987] 
        
DPW(-2)   0.166986   0.512591   0.116051   0.006988 
   (0.04514)   (0.16366)   (0.05163)   (0.01337) 
  [ 3.69899] ***  [ 3.13207] ***  [ 2.24791] **  [ 0.52257] 
        
DASS_SIS(-1)   0.333661   0.113556   0.469320   0.054691 
   (0.13259)   (0.48069)   (0.15163)   (0.03928) 
  [ 2.51644] **  [ 0.23624]  [ 3.09511] ***  [ 1.39243] 
        
DASS_SIS(-2) -0.710333  -1.873695  -0.561252  -0.150141 
   (0.12595)   (0.45661)   (0.14404)   (0.03731) 
  [-5.63975] ***  [-4.10349] ***  [-3.89657] ***  [-4.02416] *** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-1)   2.328299   7.443490   2.513236   0.505695 
   (0.45485)   (1.64898)   (0.52017)   (0.13474) 
  [ 5.11878] ***  [ 4.51399] *** ***  [ 4.83156]  [ 3.75315] *** 
        
LOAN1SIS(-2) -0.215414  -0.114185    0.523268  -0.051974 
   (0.50661)   (1.83660)   (0.57936)   (0.15007) 
 [-0.42521]  [-0.06217]  [  0.90319]  [-0.34633] 
        
C   7.374700   26.71767   8.076343   0.869056 
   (1.36227)   (4.93863)   (1.55789)   (0.40354) 
  [ 5.41354] ***  [ 5.40994] ***  [ 5.18415] ***  [ 2.15359] ** 
    
 R-squared   0.642168   0.624760   0.494982   0.439794 
 Adj. R-squared   0.600070   0.580614   0.435568   0.373888 
 Sum sq. resids   6023.376   79163.79   7877.487   528.5446 
 S.E. equation   9.411645   34.11998   10.76315   2.787959 
 F-statistic   15.25418 ***   14.15216 ***   8.331085 ***   6.673001 *** 
 Mean dependent   4.347187   8.525833   6.569981   0.203951 
 S.D. dependent   14.88243   52.68680   14.32629   3.523387 
 